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New types of service usages emerge every day in the Internet. Service usage could be 
Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) usage or watching a streamed movie. Many of 
these services are commercial, so payment is often involved in the service usage, which 
increases the risk of fraud or other misbehaviour in the interaction. To enhance the secu-
rity of both service providers and service users, improvements are needed to the existing 
procedures. 
 
The non-repudiable service usage procedure was developed as part of the TIVIT Future 
Internet SHOK -project. In this model, the service user and the service provider are 
bound to the actual service usage with certificates. The charging of the service usage is 
done using hash chains which are bound to the certificates. Now the service user pays 
only for the service he or she gets. Time or traffic based charging scheme can be used in 
the service usage. Evidence is gathered from the service usage to help solve possible 
conflicts afterwards. 
 
An actual implementation based on this model was made using Host Identity Protocol 
for Linux and RADIUS protocol. RADIUS protocol was used to gather the created evi-
dence of the service usage. The implementation was developed for Linux using C-
language. The goal of the implementation was to evaluate the concept in actual use. 
Performance of the implementation was measured with various real use scenarios to 
evaluate the feasibility of the implementation. Results indicated that the performance of 
the model is sufficient to serve several simultaneous users. However, the architecture of 
Host Identity Protocol for Linux caused some performance issues in the implementa-
tion. 
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Erilaisten palveluiden käyttö Internetissä kasvaa koko ajan. Tämä voi pitää sisällään 
esimerkiksi langattoman lähiverkon käyttöä tai virtautetun elokuvan katsomista. Usein 
palveluiden käyttö on kaupallista, joten käyttämiseen liittyy myös maksutapahtumia, 
mikä lisää huijatuksi joutumisen riskiä. Palveluiden käyttöä tulee kehittää, jotta voidaan 
parantaa palveluiden käyttäjien ja tarjoajien turvallisuutta. 
 
Tämän diplomityön taustalla olleessa TIVIT Future Internet SHOK -projektissa on kehi-
tetty toimintatapaa, jolla palvelun käytöstä tehdään kiistämätöntä. Tässä toimintatavassa 
palvelun tarjoaja ja käyttäjä sidotaan kiistämättömästi palvelun käyttöön varmenteiden 
avulla. Käyttäjä maksaa vain siitä palvelusta, jota oikeasti saa. Maksaminen tehdään 
käytön edetessä varmenteisiin sidottujen hajautusketjujen avulla. Käytön laskutus voi-
daan tehdä esimerkiksi aika- tai käyttömääräperusteisesti. Palvelun käytöstä kerätään 
todisteet, joita voidaan käyttää mahdollisten väärinkäyttötilanteiden selvittämisessä. 
 
Työssä kehitettiin Host Identity ja RADIUS-protokolliin pohjautuva toteutus kiistämät-
tömästä palvelunkäytöstä. RADIUS-protokollaa käytettiin apuna kerättyjen todisteiden 
säilöntään. Tavoitteena oli tehdä prototyyppiohjelmisto, jolla voisi tutkia kehitetyn kon-
septin soveltuvuutta käytäntöön. Toteutus tehtiin Linux-käyttöjärjestelmälle käyttäen C-
kieltä. Toteutuksen suorituskykyä erilaisissa tilanteissa mitattiin, jotta voitiin arvioida 
sen soveltuvuutta jokapäiväiseen käyttöön, erityisesti palveluiden tarjoajan näkökulmas-
ta.  Saatujen tulosten perusteella voidaan todeta, että toimintatapa soveltuu muutamille 
yhtäaikaisille käyttäjille. Mittauksissa kuitenkin havaittiin, että pohjana käytetty Linux-
pohjainen HIP-protokollan toteutus sisältää suorituskykyongelmia, jotka saattavat ai-
heuttaa koko toteutuksen hidastumista usean yhtäaikaisen käyttäjän tapauksessa. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
More and more transactions are made in the computer networks every day. The variety 
of services of a different kind also increases. The most of the time users have to interact 
with unknown actors, and the interaction is based solely on trust. Even the business be-
tween two operators is often based on trust. This increases the demand for methods of 
interacting reliably between players. 
 
In today’s global networks it is nearly impossible to get a bulletproof protection against 
frauds and misbehaving individuals and service providers. Many popular video on de-
mand or music on demand services do not provide any kind of protection for the paying 
customers. In case of fraud or malfunction, the risk for the customer to lose his or her 
payment is considerable. However, this risk of being mistreated can be greatly reduced 
with some simple improvements to the interaction between the customer and the service 
provider. Now more and more customers have awakened to demand more reliability to 
the service usage which takes place in the Internet. Offering secure service usage can be 
a competitive advantage to the operators in the future. Still, there have not been any 
widespread implementations to offer this kind of service usage.  
 
Non-repudiation aims to give theoretical tools to satisfy the aforementioned needs. Even 
though non-repudiation is a well-researched topic, it still lacks actual implementations. 
The secure service usage requires undeniability of actions to both, the operator and the 
customer. When these actors form a contract, for example in some kind of service usage 
which includes payments, either of the sides must not be able to cheat easily in any way. 
It is possible to minimize the risk in the payment transaction by splitting the payment 
into multiple smaller parts in a pay-as-you-get-service manner. Still, there needs to be a 
secure way to transmit these smaller payment units to the service provider. 
 
The purpose of this implementation is to provide a technical prototype solution to these 
problems. The main focus of the implementation is to research and test how well these 
theoretical procedures can be fitted into an actual application and whether the perfor-
mance is satisfactory to a larger scale operation. One target is to evaluate how feasible 
this solution would be in an actual operator use. 
 
The structure of the thesis is as follows. The second chapter presents the main concepts 
of the non-repudiation theory. It describes the main types and subtypes of non-
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repudiation and elements and players which are needed in a typical non-repudiable 
transaction. The third chapter contains an introduction to the technologies used in the 
prototype implementation. The chosen technologies are analyzed and compared to other 
existing similar technologies. There is also a brief introduction to the authentication, 
authorization and accounting protocols. The fourth chapter contains the functional and 
the non-functional requirements which were set for the design. The fifth chapter con-
tains an introduction to the design principles, module descriptions and the architecture 
of the implementation. The implementation includes several operation modes which are 
explained in detail. The sixth chapter contains actual implementation specific issues 
such as the data structures, parameter types and sequence diagrams. The interaction be-
tween different components is presented in several use cases. The seventh chapter con-
sists of testing and analysis. The test setup and environment is introduced, as well as the 
execution of the tests. The test results are analyzed and fulfillment of the functional and 
the non-functional requirements is examined. The eight chapter is about future work and 
how this implementation could be developed further. The ninth chapter concludes the 
work. 
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2 BACKGROUND CONCEPTS 
Non-repudation theory is based on some key elements, which are required to achieve 
the reliable non-repudiation service. There is some crucial evidence which must be col-
lected and in most of the cases help of some external party is needed. Non-repudiation 
can be used in various applications such as electronic commerce or non-repudiable con-
tracts. 
2.1 Purpose of Non-Repudiation 
Non-repudiation is a mechanism to bind all the participating entities to the committed 
transaction. This means that none of the parties can deny afterwards their involvement 
in the transaction. In a typical situation a dishonest entity could deny its participation or 
claim that some evidence related to the transaction, such as the signature, is forged. 
 
Non-repudiation services are mainly needed to support business transactions which take 
place in an insecure environment, such as the Internet. In the electronic transactions it is 
much harder to ensure involving parties’ identities than in the traditional transactions. 
Also the probability of fraud is much greater. Especially, when there is payment in-
volved in the transactions, it is crucial to bind the entities to the transaction. 
 
In the traditional cases signature is typically used to ensure non-repudiation. One’s sig-
nature in a contract proves that he or she has accepted the terms presented and is willing 
to follow them. Typically all of the involved parties get a copy of the signed agreement 
as evidence. Confirmation of entities’ identities is also easy to verify by using, e.g., the 
passport, which includes one’s signature and photograph and is considered legally as a 
strong evidence of one’s identity. Still, there is a possibility of fraud, so the most im-
portant agreements require the presence of some trusted third party such as a notary. 
 
Typically, the following entities are involved in the non-repudiable transaction which 
provides evidence [1]: 
 
 Non-repudiation of origin (NRO). The origin must provide evidence that it really 
has sent the message. The proof of origin is required to prevent cases where a 
dishonest entity may afterwards try to deny being involved in the communica-
tion. The focus of the evidence is to achieve non-repudiation instead of just 
providing evidence that the message has been sent. 
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 Non-repudiation of receipt (NRR). The receiver must provide evidence that it 
really has received the message. Proof of receipt is required to prevent cases 
similar to the previous case. 
 Non-repudiation of delivery (NRD). The transmission entity must provide evi-
dence that it has received the message from the origin to be delivered to the re-
cipient.  
 Non-repudiation of submission (NRS). The Transmission entity must provide 
evidence to the origin that it has delivered the message to recipient. 
 
Non-repudiation aims to solve these introduced problems in an electronic environment. 
This requires gathering certain evidence of the transaction between the entities. A non-
repudiable message delivery process is described in Figure 2.1 [2]. The sender creates 
the message and is responsible for providing the proof of origin. The user agent handles 
the message to the actual delivery instance. Together the sender and the user agent form 
the origin.  
 
Figure 2.1. Typical evidence in non-repudiation.[2] 
The delivery network consists of several domains through which the messages are de-
livered. The first transmission entity, which receives the message from the user agent, is 
called the origin domain and must provide the proof of submission. The last transmis-
sion entity in the delivery network provides the proof of delivery to the origin. The re-
ceiver and the user agent form the recipient side must provide the proof of receipt. 
 
2.2 Fairness 
An important requirement for non-repudiation is fairness. In the business cases it is im-
portant to try to balance the risk of being defrauded or mistreated. Typically, one of the 
Origin
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Domain
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 5 
parties is slightly in a weaker position in the risk sharing, but non-repudiation aims to 
provide a fair interaction. In [3] the following classification for the fairness levels and 
requirements is presented.  
 
In weak fairness, the fairness of the exchange is not guaranteed, but the wronged party 
will get evidence that the exchange was not fair, while it may have lost the item or the 
message used in the exchange. In an example case a dishonest shopkeeper might not 
send the item after having received the payment from the customer. However, the cus-
tomer has proof from the bank that he or she has paid the product. Gathered evidence 
can be processed in the court or by other authority afterwards. Protocols based on prob-
abilistic fairness provide the second weakest level of fairness. Execution of the protocol 
provides high level probability for fair exchange while it still leaves the possibility that 
unfair exchange can occur. The motivation for using this kind of fairness is that it does 
not require the aid of Trusted Third Party (TTP) in the exchange. In strong fairness, if 
an exchange is finished successfully, both sides must get the appropriate evidence and 
items. If an error occurs in the execution, either side must not get anything. True fair 
exchange must provide the properties of the strong fairness described earlier and the 
evidence created during the communication must not depend on how the protocol was 
executed. So the use of the TTP must not affect the execution of protocol or creation of 
the evidence to achieve true fairness.  
 
When true fairness is not feasible, the other solution is to try to minimize one’s loss in 
the situations of misbehavior. Non-repudiation is not a requirement for fairness but evi-
dence generated by the non-repudiation actions may be used afterwards to prove one’s 
misbehaving actions [4][5]. NRO and NRR mentioned in section 2.1 are the minimal 
evidence needed to ensure the fair transaction. 
2.3 Trusted Third Party 
Trusted Third Party is an entity which is used to carry out transactions between entities 
which do not trust each other. Generally, TTP is considered as the reliable entity for 
both entities. If either finds lack of trust towards the TTP, it typically compromises all 
non-repudiation and fairness procedures which rely on the use of the TTP. Because of 
this issue, there is always possibility of fraud, since it is possible that even an extremely 
trustworthy TTP begins to misbehave at some point. 
 
Use of the TTP can be divided into three main categories, online, inline and offline 
TTP. An online TTP is available all the time during the transaction. It may supervise the 
procedure, collect evidence or it may act as a verifier for the certificates at the beginning 
of the transaction. The most important thing is that both of the transaction entities may 
rely on the TTP at any point of the transaction. If the possibility to reach the TTP is lost 
during the transaction, the procedure may be compromised. 
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Inline TTP acts as a broker between the communicating entities. This requires that the 
both entities must trust the same TTP and TTP must have all communicating entities’ 
public keys pairwise or use symmetric keys. Mechanism causes privacy issues as the 
messages and transactions go through the TTP and TTP is able to examine the content 
of the messages. One solution is that TTP can decrypt only part of the message but this 
adds demand to bind the originator to the message. Inline TTP may also become a bot-
tleneck in the traffic.  
 
Another possible situation is that TTP is partly or most of the time of the transaction 
offline. In many cases the help of TTP is only needed when some problems occur dur-
ing the interaction. The problem could be a network error or misbehavior of an entity. In 
some cases, both entities deliver collected evidences to the TTP which makes decisions 
based on those and helps the transaction to finish. 
2.4 Digital Signature 
A digital signature is an electronic equivalent of the traditional signature. Typically, in 
the electronic transactions, the entities bind themselves to the transaction using the digi-
tal signature. The digital signature must fulfill certain requirements to be considered 
valid [6].  
 
1. Authenticity. After the signing process signature must convince the verifier that 
the signature is authentic and the signer commits to the signature. 
2. Unforgeability. Only the signer should be able to do an authentic signature. 
3. Non-reusability. The signature must be unique in a sense that the same signature 
could not be used in any other transaction. 
4. Unalterability. The signature must provide protection against alteration so that 
the signature cannot be invalidated after the signing process. 
5. Non-repudation. The signer cannot afterwards deny that he or she has signed the 
subject. 
 
Finnish law sets similar requirements for signatures to be valid in legal manner [7]. A 
material used to create a signature must be unique and stay confidential, e.g., private 
key used in the signing process must not be compromised. One should not be able to 
derive the signing material from any other information. The signature must be protected 
from forging and the signer must protect signature material from the use of any other 
entity. The digital signature can be used in a judicial act where a traditional signature is 
used. The signature should be based on the certificate recommendations of the law and 
fulfill previous conditions though it is considered legally valid even when all the condi-
tions are not met. At the moment Finnish authorities do not offer an adjudicator service 
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for non-repudation conflict cases. This makes the legal value of collected evidence un-
certain. 
2.5 E-Commerce 
Electronic commerce is performed more and more with digital products. In a traditional 
scenario, one goes to a shop where he or she can physically examine the item before 
buying. If one buys the item, the payment is typically made with money or credit card. 
When using the first one, shop physically gets the payment. It is possible to verify the 
payers’ identity before accepting the payment. However, when using cash, this is quite 
rare procedure and more common with credit cards. In the credit card case, the credit 
card company typically provides assurance that the shop will get the payment and it is 
possible that the credit card company takes the responsibility in possible fraud cases.  
 
In the electronic commerce situation, involved parties do not typically interact physical-
ly. In an example situation customer wants to buy a product, but does not want to pay 
before receiving it. On the other hand, the shop does not want to deliver the product 
before it gets the payment. In both cases, one entity must trust to the other to finish the 
transaction. If the customer misbehaves, he or she gets the product and the shop does 
not get the payment, or in the case the shop misbehaves, it gets the payment, but the 
customer does not receive the product.  
 
The need for micropayment may occur when, e.g., a customer wants to use a WLAN 
hotspot. The customer pays to the provider beforehand. If an error occurs during the 
usage, the customer will lose some of the payment since he or she cannot use the ser-
vice. So a mechanism similar to a phone tick system is needed to provide fair usage for 
this kind of scenario. 
2.6 Contracts 
When two parties communicate or make a contract, it is possible that afterwards one or 
both entities may deny being involved in the contract or the agreement. Similarly, one 
entity may deny its participation in the communication. In traditional cases entities are 
bound to the agreement with a signature. Typically, the signer’s identity is also verified 
in the signing situation. Help of a notary may be used to satisfy the legal issues. Typi-
cally there can be also requirements for the authenticity, integrity and confidentiality in 
the communication. To satisfy the authenticity needs, non-repudiation procedures are 
required.  For integrity and confidentiality needs some other procedures are needed. It 
should be noticed that non-repudiation mechanism solves only the problems related to 
the agreement phase. Negotiation and preparation of the terms of the contract may re-
quire further procedures and protocols. 
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3 RELATED TECHNOLOGIES 
In this chapter, some protocols which can be used to achieve non-repudiation are intro-
duced. The most important ones are Host Identity Protocol (HIP) [8] and authentication, 
authorization and accounting (AAA) protocols. Remote Authentication Dial In User 
Service (RADIUS) [9] protocol is examined more closely. Some other technologies 
were studied also. The other tools for non-repudiation are hash chains and Simple Pub-
lic Key Infrastructure (SPKI) certificates. 
3.1 Host Identity Protocol 
Basically, HIP is a key exchange protocol [8]. HIP introduces some additional features 
to traditional key exchange protocols, e.g., Internet Key Exchange Protocol (IKE) [10]. 
However, the key exchange functionality is simplified from the IKE to provide a light-
weight solution. The key elements are functionality to separate locator and identity in-
formation, end-to-end encryption and authentication, mobility, multihoming and in-
teroperability between both IP families. The protocol contains mechanisms to provide 
protection against Denial of Service (DoS) and Man in the Middle (MitM) attacks. HIP 
establishes an IPsec protected connection between the end points [8]. 
3.1.1 Cryptographic Namespace 
HIP performs the so called location and identity separation. For this separation HIP in-
troduces a new namespace, called Host Identity.  Host Identifier (HI) is an endpoint 
identifier for HIP connection. HI is basically a public-private key pair. Currently, the 
HIP implementations must support Rivers Shamir Adleman algorithm (RSA) [11] and 
should support Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) [11]. Other algorithms may also be 
supported. Using host identities as the endpoint identifiers improves the security of the 
communication between entities. Host Identifiers are computationally expensive to 
forge which provides protection for the host’s identity. 
 
For actual use Host Identity is represented in hash format. Host Identity Tag (HIT) is a 
128-bit long cryptographic hash which contains part of the original Host Identifier. HIT 
is a special type of Overlay Routable Cryptographic Hash Identifiers (ORCHID) [12]. 
Part of the HIT comes from the ORCHID section and rest from the actual Host Identity. 
ORCHID is intended to be used as purely endpoint identifier, without any locator func-
tionality. Now HIT’s can be used as regular IPv6 addresses with a low collision proba-
bility [8]. However, they are non-routable because of the ORCHID part. ORCHID part 
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is a IPv6 prefix, which is allocated non-routable in the IPv6 address space by Internet 
Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA). 
3.1.2 Host Identity Layer 
One of the Internet Protocol (IP) problems is that an IP address contains both the identi-
ty (endpoint, host) and the locator (routing label) information. HIP adds a new layer to 
the original TCP/IP stack. Position in the stack and the new endpoint identifiers are de-
scribed in Figure 3.1. In the new layer model HI acts as an endpoint identifier. Host 
identities are non-routable, so IP addresses are still used as location identifiers for rout-
ing packets.  
 
Figure 3.1. Position of Host Identity layer in layer model 
 
3.1.3 IPv4 
HIP supports both IPv4 and IPv6 protocols. For the IPv4 128-bit representation of HI 
cannot be used. A method called Local Scope Identifier (LSI) is used to provide an API 
support for legacy IPv4-only applications. LSI is a 32-bit presentation of the HI, which 
makes it shorter than HIT, but as a disadvantage it works only in a local scope because 
of a greater collision probability. 
3.1.4 Mobility and Multihoming 
The Locator/identity split gives a possibility to change the underlying IP address while 
the end-to-end connection stays online. When host’s IP address changes, HIP has a 
built-in mechanism to update existing security associations with the new address. The 
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same mechanism is used in the multihoming situation, where a host has multiple inter-
faces for the Internet connectivity. It is possible to choose specific interface, which is 
used to establish and use the HIP connection. 
3.1.5 Base Exchange 
A base exchange between HIP capable hosts contains four phases which are presented 
in Figure 3.2. An entity, which begins the interaction, is called Initiator and other entity 
is Responder. First, Initiator signals willingness to use HIP by sending a trigger packet 
I1 to Responder. I1 packet contains Initiator’s HIT and may contain Responder’s HIT 
and additional parameters. There is a possibility to use a so called opportunistic mode, 
where Responder’s HIT is not known. 
 
 
Figure 3.2. HIP Base exchange. 
 
After receiving I1, Responder sends pre-created R1 packet to Initiator if it wants to con-
tinue base exchange. R1 contains HITs of both entities and a puzzle to Initiator. The 
puzzle is a cryptographic challenge and it is used for the denial of service protection. 
Initiator must solve the puzzle to continue base exchange. R1 contains also initialization 
parameters for Diffie-Hellman (D-H) key exchange [14] and information about crypto-
graphic algorithms, which Responder supports. Responder’s public key is included as 
Initiator Responder
I1: HITi, HITr(opt)
R1: (HI
Ti, HITr
, Puzzle
, D-Hr, 
Pubkeyr
)signatu
rer
I2: (HITi, HITr, Solution, D-Hi, Pubkeyi)signaturei
R2: (HI
Ti, HITr
)signatu
rer
ESP(Data)
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the final mandatory parameter. All of these parameters are protected with Responder’s 
public key signature. 
 
After solving the puzzle Initiator creates I2 packet. I2 contains earlier mentioned HITs, 
solution to the puzzle which was in R1, Diffie-Hellman information, cryptographic al-
gorithms preferred by Initiator, and Initiator’s public key. All these parameters are cov-
ered with hashed message authentication code (HMAC) and Initiator’s signature. Key 
used with HMAC is obtained from the D-H key exchange. 
 
Responder finalizes the base exchange by sending R2 packet which contains HIT’s cov-
ered with HMAC and a signature. After that both entities consider the HIP connection 
established and data protected with Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) [15] can be 
transferred between entities. 
3.1.6 IPsec 
IPsec architecture specifies protocols to establish a secure connection through an inse-
cure network. The architecture contains four major parts: protocols for securing data, 
security policy and association handling, key management and exchange, and algo-
rithms used for authentication and encryption. The original IPsec supports two modes: 
transport and tunnel. In the transport mode transferred data can be protected with an 
authentication or encryption. Additional fields are added to a regular IP header in the 
transport mode. In the tunnel mode a secure IP in IP tunnel is established between the 
endpoints. The original IP packet is encapsulated as the payload of the outer IP packet. 
[16] 
 
HIP utilizes a new IPsec mode called Bound End-to-End Tunnel (BEET) [17]. BEET is 
a combination of IPsec transport and tunnel modes. Advantage is that BEET mode can 
pass Network Address Translations (NAT) while the transport mode cannot and there is 
less overhead than in the tunnel mode. Inner addresses are fixed addresses, in this case 
HITs, and outer IP addresses are used for the normal routing and therefore can be 
changed on the fly. 
 
3.1.7 Host Identity Protocol for Linux 
Host Identity Protocol for Linux (HIPL) is an open source Linux implementation of HIP 
which operates in Linux user space [18]. It is currently the most developed HIP imple-
mentation. The HIPL architecture consists of two main modules. HIP Daemon is the 
actual Linux daemon module which communicates with the IPsec stack. HIP Daemon 
handles all the base exchange related functionality and keeps track of open HIP connec-
tions.   
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The other important module is HIP Firewall, which is an iptables based firewall solu-
tion. It can be used to filter HIP connections. Modules communicate with each other 
using an internal communication mechanism, which is based on HIP sockets. HIP sock-
et is a new socket type registered to Linux kernel.  Use of the HIP Firewall is optional, 
if it is not in use, HIP Daemon communicates with kernel. HIPL contains a command 
line based control application called HIPconf. It uses the HIP internal communication 
mechanism to configure and set parameters for HIP Daemon.  
 
 
Figure 3.3. HIPL Architecture. 
When an application wants to establish a HIP connection, it finds out opposite side HIT 
from the modified Domain Name System (DNS) server. After receiving HIT, the appli-
cation requests a connection establishment from HIP Daemon, which initializes base 
exchange and negotiates a security association in the BEET mode. HIP Daemon uses 
the DNS server to resolve HIP-IP pair for the network level connection. The application 
uses HIT’s as a source and a destination address for packets. The IPsec layer transforms 
HIT’s to negotiated tunnel’s Security Parameter Index (SPI). IP header is also replaced 
with the BEET addressing. Figure 3.4 describes HIPL interaction with Linux. 
 
 
Figure 3.4. HIPL interaction with Linux. [18] 
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3.2 Authentication, Authorization and Accounting Proto-
cols 
Though HIP provides some security properties, a few enhancements are required to sat-
isfy the needs of non-repudiable service. In a typical roaming scenario user is roaming 
in a foreign network and the foreign operator must charge the user’s home operator after 
usage. This requires user authentication, authorization for the services, and accounting 
information about resource consumption. 
 
Authentication is a procedure where entity’s identity is verified. The entity must provide 
some information as proof of one’s identity, e.g., a password or response to a challenge 
which is verifiable by the authentication server. This information is compared with an 
access database and authentication is confirmed if there is a match.  
 
Authorization defines permissions for an earlier authenticated entity. It contains rules 
and restrictions what actions an entity can perform. Typically, authorization is done 
simultaneously with the authentication, but it can also be a separated process. It is pos-
sible that non-authenticated entity is authorized to perform some actions.  
 
Accounting contains acts which are made to gather information about the resources con-
sumed by the user. This information can be later used as evidence related to communi-
cation. Typically, accounting data can be billing information or used for auditing securi-
ty issues.  The accounting data can also be used to estimate future load and resource 
consumption of the system. [19] 
 
The purpose of AAA protocols is to provide these above-mentioned services. Typically 
one protocol can handle all of these functionalities. Common AAA protocols are RA-
DIUS [9], Terminal Access Controller Access-Control System (TACACS) [20], and 
Diameter [21]. In a basic scenario AAA client functionality is deployed to a Network 
Access Server (NAS), which acts as an access controller for the end-users. When end-
users connect to the NAS device, it sends end-user information to the AAA server 
which informs the NAS about further actions. After or during network access the NAS 
device provides accounting information about the connection to the AAA server. The 
AAA server typically contains a user database which is used to perform AAA actions to 
end-users attached to the NAS. 
3.2.1 RADIUS 
RADIUS protocol was originally developed to provide AAA functionality for dialup 
connection providers. It has been further developed to fit the needs of, e.g., a WLAN 
usage. RADIUS is a client server based protocol where the client side is deployed to a 
NAS. One of the advantages is that RADIUS is a very flexible protocol which supports 
multiple authentication mechanisms.  
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Base of RADIUS is a connectionless and stateless protocol, which works on top of User 
Datagram Protocol (UDP). It has very wide support in NAS devices. RADIUS supports 
proxy functionality between servers, which makes it ideal to use between different or-
ganizations. This causes also a shortcoming, because all the data must be transferred 
through the proxy hierarchy to the very endpoint server. In this proxy scenario it is also 
possible that the first RADIUS server grants the authorization request while some other 
server might have more updated information about the subject being authorized. With 
basic RADIUS it is impossible to cancel already made decision. Because RADIUS is 
stateless all the necessary information must be in every packet sent. [9] 
 
Because RADIUS operates over UDP, RADIUS protocol itself contains a retransmis-
sion mechanism. Many protocols rely on TCP in the retransmission functionality. On 
the other hand RADIUS AAA session must be completed fairly quickly, so even though 
TCP would be handling data transfer reliably it could take too much time. 
 
One of the advantages of RADIUS protocol is the extremely flexible message format. It 
is based on Type-Length-Value (TLV) mechanism, where each parameter has type, val-
ue and length. RADIUS messages can contain improved TLV field called Vendor Spe-
cific Attribute (VSA), which offers possibility to encapsulate various kind of parameters 
inside RADIUS messages. RADIUS VSA Attribute is described in Figure 3.5. Vendor-
id is identifier for the used VSA. Vendor type can be used for more specific information 
about the attribute. Vendor length indicates the length of the whole VSA parameter. 
Attribute-Specific section can contain multiple Attribute-Value pairs. Attribute data 
length is restricted to 255 bytes. 
 
 
Figure 3.5. RADIUS VSA-Attribute. 
 
RADIUS Packet Header
Type Length Vendor-id
Vendor-id Vendor type Vendor length
Attribute-Specific...
Vendor type
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
0 1 2 3
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Packets are authenticated with a pre-shared secret which every entity in the same RA-
DIUS set must share. The pre-shared key is only used for message authentication. RA-
DIUS does not encrypt packets; only the user password is MD5 hash of the concatena-
tion of the pre-shared secret and password, when using Password Authentication Proto-
col (PAP). To maintain security in the communication, RADIUS can be deployed only 
to a network which is secure from end to end. Privacy is also weak, since packets are 
not encrypted and there is no protection for replay attack. RADsec [22] specification is 
being developed to provide better security when using RADIUS over an insecure net-
work.  
3.2.2 RADIUS Roaming 
RADIUS Roaming can be used in a situation, where the client attaches to a foreign net-
work’s NAS. The NAS sends an access request to network’s local access controller, 
which sends an RADIUS authentication to client’s home organization RADIUS server. 
Request can be relayed through various RADIUS servers.  
 
Finnish University and Research Network (FUNET) offers a RADIUS roaming service 
to Finnish Universities and organizations. In FUNET RADIUS roaming a user, which is 
a member of FUNET RADIUS roaming organization, attaches to a public access net-
work which is managed by other FUNET RADIUS roaming organization. An access 
request is delivered to the FUNET Root Roaming Server, which delivers the request to 
roaming user’s home organization RADIUS server. An answer to the request is relayed 
back to the access controller, which decides if roaming user is allowed to connect to the 
network. [23] 
3.2.3 Diameter 
Diameter protocol aims at responding to the AAA challenges of new Internet technolo-
gies and capability requirements. Diameter is used in the IP Multimedia Subsystem 
(IMS) architecture and some other 3GPP applications to provide a AAA functionality 
between entities [24]. It also tries to improve some shortcomings of the RADIUS proto-
col. 
 
Diameter is a connection and session based protocol which supports TCP and SCTP 
transmission protocols. Diameter supports capability negotiation so the client and the 
server can try to find a service level which satisfies both. RADIUS requires static con-
figurations of peers while Diameter allows dynamic peer discovery [25]. The most im-
portant advantage in Diameter is the attribute size. It supports 16,777,215 byte length of 
parameters while RADIUS supports only 255 bytes. This gives a good flexibility for the 
vendor specific attributes. Diameter offers also a better reliability while RADIUS suf-
fers problems in congested networks [26]. 
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3.2.4 TACACS+ 
TACACS+ is a AAA protocol developed by Cisco [27]. It aims to fix some shortcom-
ings of the RADIUS protocol and add more security. TACACS+ employs TCP as a 
transmission protocol and is session based. The most important security improvement is 
that TACACS+ encrypts the whole packet body while RADIUS encrypts only the 
passwords. A shortcoming is that the encryption is made with a secret key and MD5, 
even though MD5 has some security vulnerabilities [28]. The whole packet body en-
cryption makes TACACS+ more feasible than RADIUS in insecure networks, if atten-
tion is paid to the MD5 vulnerability. Another improvement is separation of AAA func-
tionality while RADIUS combines the authentication and authorization. This allows 
more advanced authorization scenarios where non-authenticated entities may still have 
some privileges. The biggest shortcomings of TACACS+ are availability and distribu-
tion. It is not as widespread as RADIUS and available mainly in Cisco devices only, and 
every entity attached to the TACACS+ infrastructure must share the same secret. TAC-
ACS+ is lacking integrity checks in the accounting packets which make them vulnera-
ble to tampering. 
3.3 Hash Chains 
Use of hash chains was introduced in [29]. Cryptographic hash function is a one-way 
function which is easy to apply to a seed value(s), but computationally very expensive 
to reverse. A hash chain is created when the cryptographic hash function is applied to 
the results of previous hash functions. Equation (1) shows the creation process of a hash 
chain. 
  
    ( )   ( )      ( )   (1) 
 
Last piece of the chain is called an anchor value. Now it is easy for the receiver to veri-
fy, if the value belongs to the hash chain, by applying the hash function to the previous 
value. On the other hand, it is computationally difficult to perform the verification pro-
cedure without knowing the seed value. Equation (2) shows the verification process.  
 
       (  ) 
 
(2) 
 
Hash chains can be used in micropayment solutions [30] as well as in the onetime pass-
word (OTP) schemes [32] and many other purposes including authentication [31]. 
3.3.1 Infinite Length Hash Chains 
One of the problems using traditional hash chains in micropayment solutions is the fi-
nite length. Typically the duration of the service usage is not known beforehand which 
makes it difficult to estimate the right length of a hash chain.[33] proposes solution 
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where a public-key technique is used to create an infinite length hash chain. This means 
that the chain length can be increased without restarting. Equation (3) defines how the 
infinite length chain is constructed by applying a public-key based algorithm (A) and a 
private key (d) to a secret seed value (s). 
 
    (   )   (   )      (   )   (3) 
   
The verification process goes similarly, the public key algorithm used in chain creation, 
is applied to a chain piece. Equation (4) defines the verification process where (P) de-
notes the received piece and (e) chain creator’s public key.  
 
       (    ) (4) 
 
It should be noticed that the chain creator must not send the first created chain piece or 
the secret seed value is revealed to the verifier. This scheme requires the chain creator’s 
public key to be transferred to the chain verifier before the chain use can begin. 
3.3.2 Hash Chain Tree 
An unbalanced one-way binary based hash chain tree is a special application for hash 
chains [34]. In the hash chain tree one hash chain acts as a secret seed value for the oth-
er chains. This helps to save space when a large amount of pieces is need. Since every 
piece of the hash tree can be generated from a single root value, the used device does 
not have to store every value. Figure 3.6 shows an example of the unbalanced one-way 
binary based hash tree. The first chain in the horizontal direction is so called an anchor 
chain, which contains anchor values for each sub chain. The actual used chains are gen-
erated from these anchor values. 
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Figure 3.6. Unbalanced one-way binary based hash chain tree. 
In a micropayment scenario it is easy to send multiple anchor values under a single sig-
nature for the service providers. While this creates a little overhead it saves computation 
power since cryptographic verification is not needed when switching to the next chain. 
3.4 Public Key Certificates 
Public key certificates are used to bind entity’s identity or some attributes to entity’s 
public key [35]. A basic public key certificate contains only entity’s identifier, e.g., 
name or other verifiable subject, entity’s public key, issuer’s identifier and signature, 
which performs the actual binding. Certificates can be self-signed or TTP, typically 
called Certificate Authority (CA), provides a signing service for certificates. TTP may 
provide a verification service for the identities in the certificates which TTP has signed. 
 
Self-signed certificates are based on a web of trust. Certificate holders provide trust for 
each other since typically there is some strong binding between the holders. For exam-
ple if Alice has a certificate which is signed by Bob. Alice does not know Bob, but Al-
ice knows Carol, who knows that Bob can be trusted. Now Alice can also trust on Bob, 
because she knows Carol, who convinces Alice that Bob is a trustworthy person. Ulti-
mately, security is based only on trust. Compared with CA signed certificates, identity 
provided in CA certificates hold more trustworthy status than self-signed certificates, 
depending on what kind of verification CA performs to the certificate signing requester 
before signing the certificate. 
P2020P1920P220P120
P2019P1919P219P119
P201P191P21P11
P200P190P20P10
Tree root
Anchor values
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Typically, certificates provide some additional information about the entity. This infor-
mation can be used in advanced authentication and authorization situations. Commonly 
certificates have a validity period after which they have to be renewed. TTPs may offer 
also a certificate revocation service. Revocation is used when the key pair used in the 
certificate is compromised, or an entity which is certified performs some actions after 
which it cannot be trusted. The revocation functionality requires typically online TTP. 
3.4.1 X.509v3 Public-Key Infrastructure 
X.509 Public-Key Infrastructure was developed by ITU-T. It is the most widely spread 
and used PKI system in the electronic transactions. X.509 specifies certificate struc-
tures, the revocation process, and certification path validation procedures [35]. X.509v3 
is the latest version of X.509 family specification and brings some new features and 
improvements to the older ones. X.509 system uses a global namespace while, e.g., 
SPKI uses only application domain specific namespace. The global namespace and cer-
tificate complexity causes problems in scalability. Figure 3.7 shows an example of 
X.509v3 certificate. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.7. Example X. 509v3 certificate formatted for readability. 
Certificate: 
    Data: 
        Version: 3 (0x2) 
        Serial Number: 103 (0x67) 
        Signature Algorithm: md5WithRSAEncryption 
        Issuer: C=FI, O=Tampere University of Technology, OU=IT Management, CN=TUT 
Internal Root CA 
        Validity 
            Not Before: Aug 20 06:39:13 2001 GMT 
            Not After: Aug 18 06:39:13 2011 GMT 
        Subject: C=FI, O=Tampere University of Technology, OU=IT Management, CN=TUT 
Internal Root CA 
        Subject Public Key Info: 
            Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption 
            RSA Public Key: (1024 bit) 
                Modulus (1024 bit): 
                    00:b1:76:a0:67:24:86:06:e1:e5:a6:7d:34:62:a9: 
                    81:18:32:7a:81:9f:c9:aa:30:55:8a:43:df:1e:a7: 
                    11:a6:e8:7c:3d:d0:f3:ce:bc:87:71:7a:11:a6:39: 
                    81:ad:23:b3:33:f7:4a:c6:f5:fc:a1:5c:95:ca:76: 
                    c6:dd:88:4b:3d:07:04:63:c3:84:7a:07:ee:2c:7c: 
                    e3:90:bb:90:60:78:09:0d:cd:5b:a1:9e:bb:3a:f4: 
                    eb:99:a1:50:a7:5e:7b:d1:a1:aa:b2:58:bf:e8:01: 
                    6d:82:60:f2:0d:7c:ac:99:80:c4:c6:73:6f:da:dc: 
                    ad:b2:74:b0:69:b4:01:99:a9 
                Exponent: 65537 (0x10001) 
    Signature Algorithm: md5WithRSAEncryption 
        2d:ef:65:71:ec:82:2d:91:df:43:49:3c:eb:5a:75:e1:eb:9d: 
        cf:61:de:db:28:4d:3f:3b:d8:42:10:45:68:31:85:9c:04:27: 
        cd:c8:a1:7c:7c:fd:d8:5c:62:0b:81:e4:3d:3b:6f:9f:65:63: 
        a2:7b:84:85:76:5f:31:07:87:9a:d5:20:cd:b4:b5:5e:2b:4f: 
        ab:42:5b:3c:24:97:06:21:50:9a:94:ee:d4:73:87:b6:3d:85: 
        10:92:bc:81:13:e0:33:92:e2:a5:31:30:1d:b8:56:79:79:7c: 
        35:b2:11:20:75:fd:f4:19:87:b4:92:19:0a:60:80:9e:aa:26: 
        96:18 
 20 
In an example situation user wants to use X.509 certificate as a proof of his or her iden-
tity. As mentioned before, a public key certificate binds user’s identifier to a public key. 
X.509 structure allows only binding user’s actual name, which is used as a identifier, to 
the public key instead of identity. When users with the same names exist, it is difficult 
to distinguish the users from each other.  
3.4.2 SPKI 
Simple Public Key Infrastructure (SPKI) defines a simple certificate structure for decen-
tralized and distributed authorization scenarios [36]. SPKI defines two basic types of 
certificates, naming and authorization. Figure 3.8 shows an example of SPKI certificate. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.8. Example SPKI certificate. 
Naming allows binding names to public keys. Naming is valid only in the specific do-
main where SPKI is used. Authorization certificates include the possibility to delegate 
some or all of the original authorizations. This makes it possible to create chains of au-
thorization where original authorization propagates through the chain. SPKI certificates 
transferred from machine to another must be encoded in canonical S-expressions [36]. 
Canonical S-expression is a form of S-expression, where length of the element is coded 
before the atom. Figure 3.9 shows example canonical S-expression. 
 
 
Figure 3.9. Example canonical S-expression. 
Length is in the ASCII decimal format and a colon is used to separate the length from 
the actual element. 
3.4.3 KeyNote 
KeyNote introduces a trust management based solution to perform authorization. It uses 
credentials to decide whether the user is allowed to perform some actions. In the exam-
ple case when using KeyNote, used applications must provide a KeyNote Application 
Programming Interface (API). After an application has received some action request 
from the user, the application sends a KeyNote query to local the KeyNote Interpreter. 
This interpreter interprets the action request and asks authorization from the credential 
( 
(cert 
(issuer(hash sha1 (abcd))) 
(subject(hash sha1 (efgh))) 
(validity 
(not-before 2011-03-11_12:00:00) 
(not-after 2011-03-21_12:00:00))) 
(signature 
(rsa-sha1(abcd)))) 
)  
(7:example10:expression)  
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management entity. Based on the users’ credentials, the action is granted or denied. Two 
main advantages of KeyNote are easy importability and flexibility in the message syn-
tax. The syntax is less structured than, e.g., SPKI or X.509 so it allows more expressive 
notations.  
Figure 3.10 shows an example of KeyNote assertion statement. [37] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.10. Example KeyNote assertion. 
KeyNote can be used in various scenarios to provide access control and authorization.  
[38] shows example solution where KeyNote is used with IPsec to provide access con-
trol.  Due to the flexibility of KeyNote syntax, it is also suitable to be used in micro-
payment solutions [39]. 
KeyNote-Version: 2 
Authorizer: “rsa-hex:1234abcd” 
Licensees: “dsa-hex:5678efgh” 
Comment: “Authorizer offers WLAN service with time or volume based billing” 
Conditions: app_domain == “wlan” -> “true” && currency == “EUR” && amount == 
“0.15” && date < “20110315” -> “true”; 
Signature: “sig-rsa-sha1-hex:4321cdea” 
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4 SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS 
When the implementation phase began, some functional and non-functional require-
ments were set for the implementation. The functional requirements were related to 
providing the non-repudiation properties while the non-functional requirements focused 
on the user experience and security issues. The non-functional requirements were also 
used to evaluate the implementation. 
4.1 Functional Requirements 
Non-repudiable service usage implementation (NoRSU) focuses on three main goals. 
The first goal is to make it possible to offer different kind of non-repudiation services 
using HIP. These services can be for example a WLAN usage or streaming service. The 
second goal is to bind the service provider and user undeniably to the service usage. The 
third main goal is the gathering of evidences about the communication between entities. 
It should be also possible to choose whether to operate using NorSU implementation or 
traditional HIP. NoRSU incapable Responder should be capable of performing the tradi-
tional base exchange with NoRSU capable Initiator. Operation must be possible vice 
versa where Initiator is incapable to use NoRSU to provide a backward compatibility 
with vanilla HIP implementations. 
4.2 Non-Functional Requirements 
The most important non-functional requirement is to provide non-repudiation for the 
communication. All transactions and agreements made between entities must be bound 
to their identities. Also the evidence of all transactions must be gathered. 
4.2.1 Non-Repudation and Fairness 
In the base exchange Responder must commit to a service offer with a signature. If Ini-
tiator decides to agree the offer, it must commit to the agreement with a signature. Ei-
ther one of the entities must not be able to deny involvement in the agreement after-
wards. After the base exchange both entities must be bound to the sent messages until 
the session tear down. Either one of the entities must not be in a considerably weaker 
position than the other at any point in the transaction. If either one of the entities feels 
its position unfair, it must be able to withdraw from the session, without noticeable 
losses. 
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4.2.2 Expandability 
The implementation must establish a modular and easily expandable framework for the 
non-repudiable service provisioning. Because of the general nature of the framework, 
the main components must be easily changeable and modifiable. The implementation 
should provide an interface to easily add and modify new certificate types and encod-
ings. The implementation configuration files and statements should be flexible to sup-
port possible future parameters. Also the use of longer key lengths and new types for 
cryptographic algorithms and hash functions should be possible to implement easily. 
Charging schemes should be easy to customize to fulfill the needs of different service 
providing scenarios. The framework should also provide an interface for using and 
switching between different kinds of AAA protocols. There should also be an interface 
for local evidence handling. The possibility for saving evidence into files should be pro-
vided, which could be extended with a database connection in the future. 
4.2.3 Compatibility 
The framework should be compatible with existing HIP solutions, so no changes to the 
basic HIP functionality should be made. The compatibility includes HIP aware firewalls 
and middleboxes. Use of the NoRSU modes should require support only in the connec-
tion initiating and responding devices. The NoRSU functionality should be as transpar-
ent as possible to upper level applications, so no support for NoRSU is needed from the 
upper layers. However, there should be an API which is used to inform the user about 
the NoRSU related information and gather user’s approval or rejection to the service 
offers. No modifications should be made to the HIP API and legacy API. 
4.2.4 Usability 
The configuration and usage of NoRSU implementation should be simple. Configura-
tion files must be in a simple attribute value pair format. The main functionalities of the 
implementation must be configurable; this includes hash chain lengths, certificate va-
lidities and used identities. The controlling of the implementation is done using an exist-
ing HIP configuration command line user interface. There should be information availa-
ble for the user when NoRSU mode is enabled or disabled and possible error situations. 
This should be done using existing HIP debug information mechanism. The user should 
be able to adjust the amount of information given by the implementation, but the most 
critical error situations, which have effect on the service usage, must override existing 
settings. When the base exchange is finished successfully in the NoRSU mode, the user 
is not able to turn off the NoRSU functionality since this could compromise the fairness 
and non-repudiation properties. 
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4.2.5 Efficiency 
Compared to the original HIPL, NoRSU modifications must not cause major lack of the 
efficiency including hardware and network requirements. This includes minimizing the 
bandwidth usage of the NoRSU related communication. Since the original HIPL does 
not have clearly defined hardware and network requirements, efficiency can only be 
measured in how many sessions one server machine can handle. This is difficult to veri-
fy without a large test environment, so the base exchange duration and control packet 
handling times must be used to estimate the efficiency. [40] shows some evaluation 
about the performance of several HIP implementations.  
 
4.2.6 Security 
The implementation must not weaken existing HIP security properties. This includes 
DoS protection and a secure communication channel between the participating entities. 
The solution must also fulfill security requirements which are derived from the non-
repudiation functionality. This includes protection against denying being involved in the 
communication afterwards, protection against faking the identity of a participant, and 
fair execution of the base exchange. If the base exchange execution is compromised, 
implementation must try to ensure a fair position to all involving entities. In the actual 
payment phase, it must be computationally difficult to forge the units used to pay for the 
service usage. 
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5 DESIGN 
The basic principle of the design was modularity. Existing HIP properties were used as 
much as possible to provide non-repudiation. New modules can be disabled so HIP can 
operate in the original mode. This chapter describes the main components of the imple-
mentation and interoperation between different components. 
 
5.1 Architecture 
The system architecture is presented in Figure 5.1. The component interaction is de-
scribed in more detail in Section 0. Key components are HIP Daemon, RADIUS Dae-
mon (RDaemon) and RADIUS Client (RClient). HIP Daemon is responsible for the HIP 
functionality. RDaemon handles the capsulation of RADIUS packets inside HIP pack-
ets. RClient is used to communicate with the actual RADIUS server.  In the first phase, 
marked with 1 in Figure 5.1, the client initiates the connection to the server. If the nor-
mal mode is used, the base exchange continues traditionally. If the client wants to use 
the non-repudiable service, NoRSU mode is enabled in the phase one. If the TTP is not 
available, the base exchange continues as in the normal mode with NoRSU additions. If 
a HIP capable TTP is available and the server wants further verification of the client, it 
can establish a connection to the TTP.  
 
In the phase two the server requests TTP’s HIT from RDaemon. In the phase three the 
server begins the base exchange with the TTP. If the TTP is not HIP capable, the server 
goes to the phase four and connects to the TTP using RClient and the RADIUS proto-
col. If the TTP is HIP capable, in the phase four the server requests RADIUS communi-
cation from RClient. RClient creates a RADIUS message with requested parameters and 
sends it. When using RADIUS encapsulation RDaemon captures the message coming 
from RClient and transforms it to a HIP parameter in the phase five.  
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Figure 5.1. NoRSU system architecture.[41] 
In the phase six TTP’s HIP Daemon sends the HIP parameter which contains a RADI-
US message for extraction. RDaemon extracts the message from the parameter and de-
livers message to RADIUS Server in the phase seven. The eight phase describes the 
logical connection between Server and TTP RADIUS services. HIP infrastructure offers 
delivery service for RADIUS messages. 
5.2 Basic Modules 
 
Additions to the core HIPL modules are presented in Figure 5.2. Four building blocks 
for the non-repudiation are added to HIP Daemon. The first block is the certificate han-
dling module which creates, verifies, signs, encodes and decodes certificates used in the 
communication. It is extended from the basic HIP certificate module by adding support 
for S-encoding and efficient encoding, which is described in more detail in Section 6.3. 
 
HIP Firewall contains a usage control module which is used in the volume based charg-
ing. The module keeps track of transmitted data of every NoRSU enabled HIP-
connection and signals HIP Daemon when the set threshold is exceeded. The NoRSU 
control module is responsible for handling NoRSU configuration options. 
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Figure 5.2. Basic structure of the design. 
The hash chain module is responsible for creating and verifying hash chains. It also cre-
ates parameters for the hash chain renewal.  Hash chain renewal is a procedure, where 
exhausted chain is replaced with new one, without interruption in the service usage. 
Hash chain module supports traditional hash chains and public key signature based infi-
nite length hash chains. The usage control module contains functionality to monitor the 
non-repudiation process. It monitors the timers related to charging and creates mapping 
between the gathered evidence and security associations.  
5.3 RADIUS Processing 
RADIUS processing modules are presented in Figure 5.3. RDaemon contains a func-
tionality to convert RADIUS parameters to HIP parameters and vice versa. RClient 
connects to RDaemon which encapsulates the received RADIUS message to a HIP Pa-
rameter. When RDaemon receives HIP Parameter which contains an answer to the mes-
sage, it extracts the RADIUS message and returns it to RADIUS client. RDaemon also 
contains a TTP selector, which is used to select an appropriate TTP. TTP is used to veri-
fy the client side authorization certificate, which the client may supply in the base ex-
change. Different clients may have authorizations from different TTPs, so mechanism to 
choose right one is needed. RDaemon is only needed when using HIP to secure RADI-
US messaging.  
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Figure 5.3. RADIUS modules. 
HIP Daemon uses RClient to send RADIUS messages. RClient contains an API to 
communicate with RADIUS Client library. It also transforms NoRSU service attributes 
to RADIUS vendor specific attributes and RADIUS messages to NoRSU actions. For 
example, if a RADIUS message is AccessReject, RClient signals HIP Daemon to termi-
nate the base exhange. 
5.4 Operation Modes 
The implementation can operate in several modes. This includes the NoRSU mode and 
the normal mode. In the NoRSU mode the system can operate in two different setups. 
The first setup contains an initiator and a responder. This is the most basic situation 
where the responder offers non-repudiable service and the initiator wants to use it. In 
the second mode the responder uses a TTP to get additional verification of the initiator. 
Communication between the responder and the TTP is done using a RADIUS protocol. 
The responder and the TTP can also establish a HIP connection where RADIUS is en-
capsulated inside HIP control messages. 
5.4.1 Initiator Functionality in NoRSU Mode 
On the initiator side, once the NoRSU mode is enabled an additional parameter to indi-
cate the NoRSU is added to the I1 packet. The HIP Daemon configuration mechanism 
must support enabling and disabling the NoRSU mode. The user must be able to specify 
the contents of the NoRSU parameter via a configuration file. When receiving an R1 
packet, the implementation must check if an offer parameter is included, determine the 
encoding used in the certificate and verify validity time and the signature.  The initiator 
must support at least SPKI certificates in canonical S-encoding and efficient encoding 
[42] formats. If either one is invalid or missing, or the whole certificate is missing, the 
base exchange continues in a normal mode. The initiator must determine which charg-
ing type is used. At least traffic and volume based charging must be supported on the 
initiator side. In the traffic based charging support to monitor the amount of incoming 
and outgoing traffic of a specific HIP connection is added. HIP Firewall must also be 
capable of receiving threshold values, which defines how much traffic can pass through 
RDaemon
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Parameter 
handling
TTP Selector
RClient
RADIUS Client 
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with one token from the HIP Daemon and notify the HIP Daemon when the threshold 
value is exceeded.  
 
When creating the I2 packet, the initiator must use the specified configuration file to 
create a response certificate. The configuration file contains a validity period of the re-
sponse, the used hash chain and length, and HIT used in the certificate. The response 
certificate must use the same encoding that the offer certificate used. The initiator may 
also include a TTP authorization and delegation certificates in the I2 packet. If they are 
included, efficient encoding must be used. TTP and delegation certificates are specified 
in the separate configuration file. After accepting the offer and signaling the acceptance 
by sending the response certificate, the initiator must begin to monitor the hash chain 
piece sending interval condition. Pieces must be sent in the UPDATE packets and they 
must be encrypted. 
5.4.2 Responder Functionality in NoRSU Mode 
The responder supports three operating modes: a normal mode, a NoRSU mode and a 
NoRSU mode with AAA messaging. In the NoRSU mode when the responder receives 
an I1 packet with the NoRSU parameter it must include a service offer in the R1 packet. 
The responder may also include a TTP service authorization. If the I1 packet contains 
information about the desired service, the responder may follow the wish. Types of of-
fered services, charging amounts and intervals, used encodings and service offer dura-
tions are specified in the configuration file. The responder must support at least SPKI 
certificates in canonical S-encoding and efficient encoding formats. If a TTP authoriza-
tion is included, the efficient encoding is mandatory. Use of the S-encoding would 
cause the control packet to fragment. If the I1 packet does not contain the NoRSU pa-
rameter, the base exchange continues in the normal mode which is described in Section 
5.4.4. If the I2 packet contains a response certificate, the responder must verify the hash 
of the offer, a validity period of the certificate and the signature. The response certifi-
cate, which the initiator creates, must also be in the same encoding format as the offer 
certificate. If any of these conditions are not met, the responder must continue the base 
exchange in the normal mode. If the response certificate is accepted, monitoring the 
charging must be initialized and in the volume based charging HIP Firewall must be 
configured similarly as on the initiator side. The configuration file must specify thresh-
old values for how many and how long chain pieces can be missing. Figure 5.4 de-
scribes the base exchange in NoRSU mode. 
 
 30 
 
Figure 5.4. Base exchange in NoRSU mode. 
 
5.4.3 Responder Functionality in NoRSU Mode with AAA Messaging 
In the NoRSU mode with AAA messaging, after receiving the I2 packet, the responder 
contacts the AAA server specified in the configuration file. The server may ask further 
verification for initiator’s identity and establishes an accounting session. If the AAA 
server returns a negative answer to the query, the responder must tear down the base 
exchange. The responder must support at least the RADIUS protocol for the AAA func-
tionality. After connection teardown between the initiator and the responder, the re-
sponder must send used certificates and accounting information using AAA functionali-
ty to the AAA server. In the NoRSU mode the responder must save this information 
locally. Communication using the AAA server is described in Figure 5.5 
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Figure 5.5. Base exchange with AAA support. 
 
If the used network is insecure and the AAA provider is HIP capable, it is possible to 
establish a HIP session between the responder and the AAA provider. Communication 
goes like in the previous case, though the HIP responder must now relay AAA messages 
carried by HIP to the available AAA server. After the connection establishment, it may 
remain available to further AAA communication. The responder side HIP must be able 
to relay AAA requests over the second HIP connection.  This functionality is described 
in Figure 5.6. 
 
The responder may try to establish connection to several AAA providers during the base 
exchange. If any of them do not respond, it may fall back to a simple scenario where the 
AAA information is stored locally. The initiator may also include information about the 
AAA provider during the base exchange. 
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Figure 5.6. Base exchange with HIP capable AAA. 
5.4.4 Normal Mode 
In the normal mode the implementation must act as specified in [8]. A NoRSU unaware 
initiator must be able to establish connection to a NoRSU aware responder. It is not al-
lowed to move from the normal mode to the NoRSU mode without establishing the base 
exchange first. Transition to the normal mode from the NoRSU mode during the base 
exchange must be supported in both the initiator and the responder side. The normal 
mode is only for maintaining compatibility. Transition to the normal mode will immedi-
ately end the service usage. 
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6 IMPLEMENTATION 
In this chapter, most of the key implementation details are described. The implementa-
tion was done using C programming language and Ubuntu Linux 9.04 as development 
environment. The implementation is based on the HIPL 1.04 and it can be installed as 
an update to normal HIPL 1.04.  
6.1 Host Association Database 
Host Association Database (HADB) contains all data related to a one host association. 
Host association is a connection between two HIP hosts and which endpoints have 
common keying material. This was a natural place to store the NoRSU specific infor-
mation. HADB is a single struct containing pointers to connection options. The follow-
ing parameters were added to the struct. Table 6.1 contains certificate related variables. 
 
Table 6.1. Certificate related variables in HADB. 
Variable Type Description 
hip_cert_spki_offer struct Storage for SPKI encoded 
offer certificate 
hip_cert_spki_response struct Storage for SPKI encoded 
response certificate 
hip_cert_eff_offer struct Storage for efficient en-
coded offer certificate 
hip_cert_eff_response struct Storage for efficient en-
coded response certificate 
hip_cert_eff_ttp struct Storage for efficient en-
coded TTP certificate 
hip_cert_eff_dele struct Storage for efficient en-
coded delegation certificate 
 
For the infinite hash chain support, separate variables were needed. Since only one type 
of hash chain can be used simultaneously, the same counter variables are used for both 
chain types. Table 6.2 lists hash chain related variables. 
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Table 6.2. Hash chain related variables in HADB. 
Variable Type Description 
norsu_hash_chain_values unsigned char * array Array to store pointers 
to unused hash chain 
value in the client side 
norsu_hash_chain_values_switch unsigned char * array Array to store pointers 
to received hash chain 
switch parameters 
norsu_rcvd_chain_values unsigned char * array Array to store received 
hash chain pieces the 
server side 
sent_hash_counter unsigned int Counter for amount of 
sent hash chain pieces 
in the current chain 
client side 
rcvd_hash_counter unsigned int Counter for amount of 
received hash chain 
pieces in the current in 
the server side 
norsu_first unsigned char * Even hash chain piece 
in infinite length chain. 
Sent piece in the client 
side and received in the 
server side 
norsu_second unsigned char * Uneven hash chain 
piece in infinite length 
chain. Sent piece in the 
client side and received 
in the server side 
 
The general service related parameters are also stored in the HADB. These include type 
of used encodings, hash chain types, hash chain lengths, RADIUS specific variables and 
timers for service usage. Table 6.3 contains the service related variables. 
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Table 6.3. Service related variables in HADB. 
Variable Type Description 
cert_counter int long Counter used to monitor 
elapsed time, when using 
time based charging 
cert_clock int Flag to store information, if 
time or traffic based charg-
ing is used. 
norsu_encoding int  Flag to store information, if 
SPKI or efficient encoding 
is used. 
norsu_chain_len int Used hash chain length 
norsu_duration int Duration of the service 
usage 
rad_state int Flag to indicate RADIUS 
message exchange state 
ttp_ha int HIT of the used TTP 
hash_total unsigned int Total amount of received 
and sent hash chain pieces 
 
 
The HADB stores history information about the service usage which is needed when 
sending evidence to the TTP. Though the RADIUS protocol is stateless, the NoRSU 
usage requires keeping track of the state, so decision about when to accept or deny the 
incoming connection based on the RADIUS authorization and the accounting infor-
mation can be made. Since the host association database is removed when a HIP con-
nection is closed, the connection related information must be stored before sending 
CLOSE/CLOSE ACK packets. 
6.2 Packet Size Restrictions 
To avoid vulnerability against DoS attacks, packet sizes were decided to keep under the 
IPv6 recommended MTU size of 1280-byte to prevent fragmentation of the packets 
[43]. Table 6.4 shows mandatory HIP control packet sizes with default sizes of 1536-bit 
D-H key length and 1024-bit RSA keys in the signatures. The two possible sizes for R1 
are offer certificate and offer certificate along TTP certificate. The three possible sizes 
for the I2 packet are response certificate, response and TTP certificate and response 
certificate with TTP and delegation certificates. 
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Table 6.4. HIP packet sizes in bytes. 
Encoding I1 R1 I2 R2 
S-enc. 152 966/1352 968/1354/1698 216 
Eff. 152 807/950 807/950/1137 216 
Normal 40 640 608 216 
 
6.3 Certificate Modifications 
Vanilla HIP has support for handling X.509v3 and SPKI based certificates with a mini-
mal required content. This support was extended with NoRSU certificates. Figure 6.1 
shows certificate parameter structure [44]. The only restriction for the certificate field 
length is the size of the control packet.  
 
 
Figure 6.1. HIP Certificate parameter structure. 
 
Certificates are created based on the configuration file. The parser reads this configura-
tion file and transforms configuration options to SPKI statements. Options are in a sim-
ple attribute value-pair format. Options for NoRSU certificates were added to this con-
figuration and parser was modified to accept new options. Table 6.5 shows new certifi-
cate types, HIP parameters and numbers. HIP allows grouping of CERT parameters so 
long certificates can be divided into multiple control packets. This option could not be 
used in this solution since the agreement of the service usage must be made during the 
base exchange. 
 
 
Type
Cert-group Cert count Vendor-id
Certificate...
Padding
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
0 1 2 3
Length
Cert ID Cert type
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Table 6.5. New certificate parameters. 
Certificate HIP Parameter 
SPKI Encoded Offer Certificate HIP_PARAM_CERT_SPKI_OFFER 
(32826) 
SPKI Encoded Response Certificate HIP_PARAM_CERT_SPKI_RESPONSE 
(32827) 
Efficient Encoded Offer Certificate HIP_PARAM_CERT_EFF_OFFER 
(32828) 
Efficient Encoded Response Certificate HIP_PARAM_CERT_EFF_RESPONSE 
(32829) 
 
For the efficient encoding, the same configuration file parser was used for the options. 
Options were transformed into binary encoding. Table 6.6 describes used SPKI state-
ments in the efficient encoding format. All statements are encoded in a type value for-
mat containing fixed size values to avoid collisions when parsing the certificate. 
 
Table 6.6. SPKI statements and binary encoded equivalents. 
SPKI statement Binary 
encoding 
Size in 
bytes 
Description 
cert 0xaeba  4 Beginning statement for SPKI certificate 
validity not after 0xff02 6 Validity period of the offer 
issuer 0xff03  22 Issuer of the certificate 
offer s 0xff04 6 Offer using time based charging, unit se-
cond 
offer b 0xff05 6 Offer using volume based charging, unit 
byte 
hash of offer 0xff08 22 Hash of the offer 
hash chain anchor 0xff09 22 Anchor value of the used hash chains 
subject 0xff10 22 Subject of the certificate 
target service 0xff11 22 Target service for delegation 
amount-max 0xff12 6 Maximum amount of usage, unit second 
propagate 0xff13 2 Is propagation allowed 
validity period 0xff14 10 Validity range of the certificate 
signature-rsa-sha1 0xffaa 128 RSA-SHA1 signature 
signature-dsa-2048 0xffbb 448 2048 bit DSA signature 
 
In the SPKI encoded certificate verification, a parser based on regular expressions is 
used. Based on the input statement, the parser returns value of the statement. For NoR-
SU statements the parser was modified to verify NoRSU related values. The parser also 
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configures the NoRSU connection attributes in the HADB based on the parsed values. 
Efficient encoding is parsed based on known lengths of the fields.  
Figure 6.2 shows example certificate in the efficient encoding format presented in hexa-
decimals and in the canonical S-expression formatted for readability. The efficiently 
encoded SPKI statements are bolded. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.2. Offer certificate in efficient and canonical S-expression encoding format. 
6.4 Hash Chain Support 
For testing purposes the hash chain method is capable of creating two kinds of hash 
chains. The traditional chains are created using SHA-1 hash function and a random seed 
value. Parameters related to the chain are located in the HIP configuration file. These 
parameters are the hash chain length and the amount of chains. The first chain is created 
after receiving the offer from the server. The mechanism supports also importing exter-
nally created chains. The used hash chain values are stored in the host association data-
base. This enables the implementation to recover from the situation where several hash 
chain pieces are lost in the transport channel. 
 
It is also possible to chain multiple traditional hash chains using the hash chain switch-
ing. In the hash chain switch a special switch parameter is created. The switch parame-
ter contains a concatenation of the second last value of the exhausted chain and the an-
chor value of the new chain. This concatenation parameter is signed with client’s private 
Canonical S-expression: 
 
( 
(4:cert 
(6:issuer(4:hash4:sha120:abcd..)) 
(5:offer(4:time(1:1(3:s60))) 
(8:validity(9:not-after19:2012-01-16_19:00:00)) 
) 
(9:signature(8:rsa-sha1128:abcd...)) 
) 
 
Efficient encoding: 
 
03 00 00 c0 01 01 00 32 f0 b2 48 b7 ae ba ff 10 d4 33 61 21 fb 6a 
64 e5 ad 5a 8a 9c 4a 97 69 73 c3 47 a0 2e ff 04 00 03 ff 02 4e 34 
3f 2e ff aa 3d c6 7b 62 c6 b3 e9 21 df 20 e0 85 d8 c0 a5 17 18 77 
59 4a ed d5 be b6 75 e0 63 e3 1b 57 ec 16 2b 06 d7 43 14 ab f1 be 
23 f0 9f c5 10 a1 fc ce 8d 24 7c 0b a8 a5 3f db 63 70 65 07 95 21 
b2 14 7d 84 be d1 cd 3f c2 4c 40 e3 1b a6 1c 21 b2 cd 0b b8 b7 04 
dd 17 f7 3c d5 b3 c3 c6 b1 fe 44 67 65 09 f7 05 ba 4c 93 9b 6b 2f 
8c 9a a1 d6 0b 02 3a 29 ce 9d ab 8e e0 e6 fd dd e5 01 b7 e2 3f 09 
20 01 00 10 ad e5 28 6d 36 84 7d e7 91 80 a7 f6 
00 00 00 00 
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key to ensure the continuation of the evidence chain needed in the non-repudiation. If a 
UPDATE packet containing the switch parameter is lost, it is impossible to recover 
from the situation and the connection must be terminated. 
 
The second kind of hash chains are infinite length hash chains, which are created using 
RSA algorithm and host’s private key. The first value is created from a random seed 
value and the next element is generated using previous value as a seed. Because of the 
packet size caused by infinite length chain pieces, this functionality is disabled by de-
fault. It can be enabled from the HIP configuration file or using the HIP configuration 
tool. Appendix A: Example Norsu Configuration shows an example configuration file. 
6.5 Charging 
Two types of charging schemes were implemented: time and volume based charging. In 
the time based charging the customer pays for the time he or she uses the service. In the 
volume based charging the customer pays for some resource consumed during the ser-
vice. In this solution the chargeable resource is transferred data. Other chargeable re-
source could be f. ex. processor time or amount of database queries. 
6.5.1 Time Based 
The time based charging uses ticks to determine the moment to send the hash chain 
piece. The tick length is in the offer certificate and when the client accepts the offer; 
both the entities adjust their internal timers to the agreed tick length. Any time synchro-
nization protocol is not used so both timers run in a little bit different time. Timers 
coarsely synchronize when the hash chain piece is sent and verified. Depending on 
whether the timer reset is made on UPDATE sent or UPDATE ACK, server’s or client’s 
clock is always a little bit ahead. In this solution client’s timer is a little bit ahead to 
avoid unnecessary timer expirations caused by the transmission delay. Server’s timer 
contains a threshold which allows the delay of three ticks before the timer expires. Be-
cause of coarse timing, extremely long or short tick times should not be used to achieve 
smooth operation. In this solution the default tick length is one second. 
6.5.2 Volume Based 
Transferred data based charging in this solution is implemented using HIP Firewall. The 
used threshold value is in the offer certificate and when the agreement is made, the cli-
ent and the server setup their HIP Firewalls with the agreed value. The used socket op-
tions are described in Table 6.7. The client monitors incoming IPsec traffic for the spe-
cific connection and when the threshold value is exceeded, HIP Firewall signals HIP 
Daemon to send the hash chain piece. The server monitors outgoing IPsec traffic for the 
specific connection. Figure 6.3 shows interaction between HIP Daemon and Firewall 
when a traffic threshold is first set and later exceeded. 
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Table 6.7. Socket options used in firewall communication. 
Signaled event HIP Socket option 
Threshold exceeded SO_HIP_HASHCHAIN_OFF (203) 
Reset traffic threshold monitor SO_HIP_COUNTER_RESET (207) 
Set value to traffic threshold monitor SO_HIP_COUNTER_SET (208) 
 
If the hash chain piece is not received when the threshold value is exceeded, depending 
on how many missing chain pieces is allowed, the connection expires. Since IPsec traf-
fic is encrypted, also TCP/UDP and IP overhead is included in the monitored traffic. 
This causes inaccuracy to the measurement. 
 
 
Figure 6.3. Interaction between HIP Daemon and Firewall. 
 
HIP Firewall is based on iptables tool [45]. HIP Firewall monitors incoming and out-
going packets based on preconfigured rules. Because of this, settings for the HIP Fire-
wall must be configured before the base exchange. This restricts the usability since 
HITs, IP address, or the used network interface must be known beforehand to create the 
appropriate rules for the connection monitoring. 
6.6 HIPconf 
HIPconf is a utility to set the runtime configuration to HIP Daemon. HIPconf uses the 
internal communication mechanism and sends parameters and configuration options to 
HIP Daemon as socket options. HIPconf works one way only, so it does not receive a 
response from the HIP Daemon for the sent commands. HIPconf is used to enable and 
enable various NoRSU related options. The possible options are listed in Table 6.8. All 
existing configuration options remained untouched. 
HIP Daemon (Client) HIP Daemon (Server)
HIP Firewall (Server)
I1
R1
I2
HIP Firewall (Client)
SO_HIP_COUNTER_SET
SO_HIP_COUNTER_SET
R2
UPDATE
SO_HIP_COUNTER_SET
SO_HIP_HASHCHAIN_OFF
ACK
SO_HIP_COUNTER_SET
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Table 6.8. Added HIPconf options. 
Configuration option HIPconf pa-
rameter 
HIP socket option (number) 
Enable NoRSU service norsu on SO_HIP_NORSU_ON (204) 
Disable NoRSU service norsu off SO_HIP_NORSU_OFF (205) 
Enable NoRSU server 
mode 
norsu server 
on 
SO_HIP_NORSU_SERVER_ON (209) 
Disable NoRSU server 
mode 
norsu server 
off 
SO_HIP_NORSU_SERVER_OFF (210) 
Enable SPKI encoding encoding spki SO_HIP_NORSU_ENCODING_SPKI 
(211) 
Enable efficient encoding encoding eff SO_HIP_NORSU_ENCODING_EFF 
(212) 
Enable infinite length 
hash chains 
pubkeyhash 
on 
SO_HIP_NORSU_PUBKEYHASH_ON 
(213) 
Disable infinite length 
hash chains 
pubkeyhash 
off 
SO_HIP_NORSU_PUBKEYHASH_OFF 
(214) 
Recreate pre created cer-
tificates 
create offer on SO_HIP_NORSU_CREATE_OFFER 
(215) 
Enable RADIUS mes-
sage relay to external 
RADIUS server 
radrelay on SO_HIP_RADIUS_RELAY_ON (219) 
Disable RADIUS mes-
sage relay to external 
RADIUS server 
radrelay off SO_HIP_RADIUS_RELAY_ON (220) 
 
All of the configuration options cannot be used simultaneously. Certificate encoding can 
be either SPKI or efficient encoding for example. The encoding mode must be chosen 
before the base exchange and cannot be changed on the fly during the connection. 
6.7 RADIUS Implementation 
The RADIUS support is divided into two components. RClient offers functionality to 
use the RADIUS client with the HIP internal communication mechanism. RDaemon 
offers functionality to establish a HIP connection with TTP and RADIUS message en-
capsulation to HIP control packets. Figure 6.4 shows interaction between different com-
ponents. Components and phases are similar to Figure 5.1.  
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Figure 6.4. Interaction between different components.[41] 
If the HIP connection between the TTP and the server is already established when the 
base exchange between the client and the server begins, RADIUS messages are deliv-
ered to the TTP using UPDATE packets in the phase 3. 
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6.7.1 RClient 
RClient is a daemon which performs the RADIUS protocol client functionality. RClient 
offers an API to RADIUS clients and HIP internal communication mechanism. RClient 
receives RADIUS connection requests from HIP Daemon and is connected to RDae-
mon. When HIP Daemon requests a RADIUS message, RClient creates an appropriate 
message using attached the RADIUS client. After this the RADIUS client sends the 
message to RDaemon which emulates the RADIUS server. The RADIUS message trav-
els through the HIP connection to the actual RADIUS server. HIP socket options used 
between RClient and HIP Daemon are described in Table 6.9. 
 
Table 6.9. RClient communication socket options. 
Signaled event HIP Socket option 
Access Request SO_HIP_RADIUS_SEND (222) 
Accounting Request (Start) SO_HIP_RADIUS_ACC (223) 
Access Accepted SO_HIP_RAD_AUTH_OK (224) 
Accounting Request (Stop) SO_HIP_RAD_ACC_DATA (225) 
 
When the response is received, RDaemon returns the response to RClient. This func-
tionality hides the actual transport channel from the RADIUS client. The RADIUS cli-
ent interprets the contents of the message and signals HIP Daemon about the response 
type. RClient supports access and accounting request messages. RClient contains a par-
ser to create RADIUS vendor specific attributes based on the parameter received from 
HIP Daemon. Figure 6.5 shows interaction between components in connection 
teardown. HIP Daemon sends evidence collected in the HADB during the connection to 
RClient. Certificates are transported in HIP_PARAM_CERT and hash chain sets in 
HIP_PARAM_RADIUS_HASHVALUE. RClient creates vendor specific attributes 
based on the received evidence. Table 6.10 shows how evidence is encapsuled in VSA. 
 
Table 6.10. Evidence in Vendor Specific Attributes. 
Archived evidence Vendor Type 
Offer certificate 1 
Response certificate 2 
TTP certificate 3 
Delegation certificate 4 
Total received hash chain pieces 5 
Hash chain anchor value 6 
Last received chain value 7 
Received pieces in chain 8 
Hash chain switch value 9 
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If the connection to TTP is already established when closing procedure begins, the UP-
DATE packet is used to carry RADIUS parameters. Otherwise connection to the TTP is 
established to deliver the evidence. One UPDATE packet is able to carry Offer, Re-
sponse, TTP, Delegation certificates and two hash chain sets, if the certificates use the 
efficient encoding. For rest of the hash chain sets as much UPDATE packets as needed 
is sent to deliver all connection related data to the TTP. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.5. Connection teardown. 
 
6.7.2 RDaemon 
RDaemon implements two major functionalities. The first one is TTP finding mecha-
nism. Available TTP HIT’s are configured to the HIP configuration file under [ttp_hit] 
section. HIP Daemon uses internal HIP messaging via dedicated socket to signal TTP 
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connection request to RDaemon. The same mechanism is used in the communication 
between HIP Daemon and HIP Firewall. 
 
When RDaemon receives a TTP connection request, it chooses the first suitable HIT 
and triggers HIP a base exchange via internal communication mechanism. Because HIP 
Daemon runs in a single thread, all other active and incoming HIP connections are 
blocked until the triggered base exchange is finished. 
 
The second functionality is RADIUS message encapsulation and decapsulation. HIP 
Daemon works in cooperation with RClient. RDaemon listens to the port 985 for UDP 
messages and emulates a RADIUS server to RClient. After a RADIUS message is re-
ceived RDaemon creates HIP Parameter from the received RADIUS message and uses 
internal HIP communication mechanism to deliver the parameter to HIP Daemon. After 
this, HIP Daemon applies the received parameter to an appropriate HIP control packet. 
Table 6.11 shows mapping between RADIUS messages and HIP parameters. 
 
Table 6.11. Mapping between RADIUS messages and HIP Parameters. 
RADIUS Message HIP Parameter 
Access-Request HIP_PARAM_RADIUS (32832) 
Accounting-Request HIP_PARAM_RADIUS_ACC (32835) 
 
On the other side, HIP Daemon delivers received HIP Parameters containing RADIUS 
messages to RDaemon. RDaemon extracts the RADIUS message and forwards it to the 
receiver. Depending on the role, a server or a client, the receiver can be a RADIUS 
server or RClient. RDaemon remains listening to the input channel for the possible re-
sponse message. 
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7 ANALYSIS 
The performance of the implementation was tested to study the effects of the non-
repudiation modifications. The other focus of testing was to evaluate the fulfillment of 
functional and non-functional requirements introduced in Chapter 4. Test setup was 
designed to act as a typical usage scenario for the implementation. Actual test cases 
often used in software engineering [46] were not designed. Since the focus of the work 
was to evaluate the user experience and the functionality of the system as a whole, it 
was found not so useful to put effort to verify the operation of some minor feature. Con-
firming the requirements guided the testing process. 
7.1 Test Environment 
Testing was performed in a laboratory environment. The test setup contained three ma-
chines which were connected to each other. Machines were connected to a local area 
network. In the RADIUS roaming setup introduced in 0, 1000Mbit Internet connection 
to FUNET was used. Figure 7.1 shows the physical setup in the laboratory. NoRSU1 
and NoRSU2 were connected using SMC Wireless 54Mbit USB Adapters. NoRSU2 
and NoRSU3 were connected with 1000Mbit Ethernet connection. 
 
 
Figure 7.1. Physical setup in the laboratory. 
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DHCP server was running in a VMWare based virtual machine. IPv6 addressing was 
used between all hosts and IPv4 addressing was disabled.  
7.1.1 Test Platform 
The used test machines had corresponding performance of today’s low end home com-
puters. Tests were also performed in a virtual machine environment, but results were 
inconsistent because of the unbalanced processor load. The virtualization platform ma-
chine had two physical processor cores, but when three virtual machines and host oper-
ating system were running at the same time, the load grew too high. Machines intro-
duced in Table 7.1 gave consistent results through the measurements. 
 
Table 7.1. Test machine specifications. 
Device Processor Memory 
NoRSU1 Pentium 4 1,7 GHz 1024MB 
NoRSU2 Athlon XP 1,53 GHz 1024MB 
NoRSU3 Pentium 4 2,4 GHz 1024MB 
 
Because of the physical setup instead of virtualization, testing was restricted to single 
connections between hosts. Because of the different processor types, processor loads 
were not monitored. Hyperthreading in NoRSU3 was turned off during the tests. 
7.1.2 Test Software and Execution 
The operating system in the test machines was Debian 5.0.2 “Lenny”. The kernel ver-
sion was 2.6.26-2-686, which contains BEET functionality. All tests were performed 
using 1024-bit RSA keys and 1536-bit Diffie-Hellman group. For other options HIP 
default values were used. A special version of HIPL 1.04 was used, which contains pos-
sibility to set measurement points in the source code. These points were used to measure 
different events during the base exchange. The original source code contained approxi-
mately 50 000 and non-repudiation modifications consisted of 5000 lines of code. This 
includes new and modified lines. 
7.2 Performance Measurements 
In the performance measurements, the main focus was in the base exchange duration. It 
can be used to evaluate how well the implementation would work in the actual scenari-
os. It also gives some hints about how many clients one server can handle. If one base 
exchange takes some amount of time, this time can be used to evaluate the user experi-
ence in the client side. All measurement results are comparable with each other. 
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7.2.1 Non-Repudiation Modifications 
The first round of measurements was performed with non-repudiation modifications. In 
this setup, NoRSU1 and NoRSU2 were used. Figure 7.2 shows base exchange duration 
on the server side in three cases. Normal refers to Vanilla HIPL implementation and two 
others to the implemented version. Measurements were made using a script which start-
ed a base exchange, waited 4 seconds, disconnected and started the base exchange again 
after 1 second. Results are averages of 100 measurements. With all versions measure-
ment began on the server side, when server started to process the I1 packet and finished 
after the R2 packet was sent. 
 
 
Figure 7.2. Server side base exchange duration. 
In the version with NoRSU modifications, the verification of the response certificate 
was done on the client side. The creation of the offer certificate was not counted since it 
is pre-created when creating a R1 packet. Figure 7.3 shows the base exchange duration 
in same three scenarios on the client side. 
 
Figure 7.3. Client side base exchange duration. 
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On the client side the measurement was done from the I1 packet creation to the verifica-
tion of the R2 packet. This includes the verification of the offer certificate and creation 
of the response certificate. Traditional, not infinite length, hash chain anchor value was 
used in the response certificate. The hash chain was created during the creation of the I1 
packet. The hash chain length of 100 was used. Table 7.2 shows processing times in 
more detail. Results were quite near what was expected. The most of the delay in the 
server side is caused from the verification of the response certificate RSA signature. In 
the client side verification of the offer certificate signature and creation of the response 
certificate signature causes the delay. 
 
Table 7.2. Detailed processing times in seconds. 
 R1 Handling (Cli-
ent) 
I2 Handling (Serv-
er) 
I2 Creation (Cli-
ent) 
S-Enc 0,106 0,116 0,039 
Eff. Enc 0,090 0,093 0,036 
Normal 0,062 0,085 0,017 
 
The difference between the S-Encoding and efficient encoding is caused by the parser. 
The S-Encoded parser is based on the regular expressions and allows more flexible cer-
tificates. The efficient encoding is assumed to follow strict order in the certificate struc-
ture which improves the performance but weakens the flexibility. Figure 7.4 shows per-
formance in the creation of the UPDATE packet. 
 
 
Figure 7.4. Client side UPDATE packet creation times. 
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switch parameter is used to replace the exhausted chain to a new one. It also binds 
chains together with the client RSA signature, which causes the greater time consump-
tion. Similarly infinite hash chains are based on signatures. Even though both times are 
approximately five times higher than normal UPDATE packet creation times, they are 
still nearly ten times faster than the creation of the I2 packet.  
 
The most time consuming operation on the processing of the switch parameter and the 
infinite length hash chain is RSA signature verification. Difference between switch pa-
rameter and infinite length chain verification time is caused by the verification of the 
traditional chain piece.  Figure 7.5 shows UPDATE packet verification times in the 
server side, which is evaluated in three cases. 
 
 
Figure 7.5. Server side UPDATE packet verification times. 
Again, normal refers to the packet with a single hash chain piece. Since the switch pa-
rameter contains values from two chains, it must be verified that other value belongs to 
the old chain before taking the new chain’s anchor into use. Though these verification 
times are much faster than any base exchange related operations, it must be noticed that 
the server typically receives messages from multiple customers. However, it is unlikely 
that many clients send switch parameters simultaneously. More typical operation to the 
server is the verification of the traditional chain piece, which takes only 0,0002s. 
7.2.2 RADIUS Support and Roaming 
The next measurement target was the base exchange duration when using TTP. In the 
first setup TTP connection was static and during the base exchange the server verified 
the client’s identity from the TTP using the RADIUS protocol, which was encapsulated 
inside HIP UPDATE packets. In the second setup, a connection between the server and 
the TTP was dynamic during the base exchange. Figure 7.6 shows the base exchange 
duration in the client side when using TTP. 
 
0
0,0002
0,0004
0,0006
0,0008
0,001
Update packet verification times
D
u
ra
ti
o
n
 (
s)
 
Normal
Switch
Inf. Chain
 51 
 
Figure 7.6. Base exchange duration when using TTP. 
The use of dynamic base exchange duration is almost three times greater in the client 
side than the normal HIP base exchange. Typically, this happens only once and the con-
nection to the TTP remains open. The most of the duration is caused by slow socket 
handling when using HIP internal communication mechanism between daemons. Rea-
son for this was artificial delay in socket handling. Decreasing this delay caused errors 
in the socket functionality, especially in the UNIX select() function performance [47]. 
Although this issue was investigated, no obvious reason was found. It must also be no-
ticed that because of the single threaded nature of HIP Daemon, it is in the blocking 
state for the whole base exchange duration, which can be problematic with a large 
amount of clients. In this setup the RADIUS server and TTP located physically in the 
same machine, but in a real life scenario they can operate in separate machines which 
causes even more delay. 
 
RADIUS roaming was tested in an additional test setup. NoRSU1 acted as a client who 
wished to roam into the network where NoRSU2 acted as a gateway. During the base 
exchange between NoRSU1 and NoRSU2, NoRSU2 asked confirmation from the 
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and forwarded the request to the RADIUS server of the home organization of NoRSU1, 
which made decision to accept or decline the request. This server replied to the FUNET 
server which relayed the answer to NoRSU2. If roaming was allowed, NoRSU2 contin-
ued the base exchange. Figure 7.7 shows the test setup. 
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Figure 7.7. Test setup in the RADIUS roaming scenario. 
In this setup RADIUS messages went directly from NoRSU2 to the FUNET server 
through the Internet. Because there is no delay caused from the HIP socket handling and 
processing, roaming is almost as fast as the normal HIP base exchange. However, the 
connection between NoRSU2 and the FUNET RADIUS server is not protected, which 
makes this scenario not feasible to actual use, since privacy of the roaming client is 
compromised. 
7.3 Implementation Analysis 
The implementation was evaluated against the non-functional requirements which were 
set in Section 4.2. Objective measurements to these requirements are difficult to per-
form, so the main focus is on introducing the solutions which were made in the imple-
mentation. In overall the requirements were pretty loose due to the prototype nature of 
the project. 
7.3.1 Expandability 
The implementation is pretty modular in most core functions. New certificate types can 
be added by just implementing new creation and verification functions and adding new 
parameter types. New encoding types for existing certificates require re-implementation 
of existing creation functions. Since various encoding types exist, creating a general 
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encoding framework was too time-consuming within the confines of the project. New 
cryptographic hash functions can be easily taken into use by implementing hash chain 
creation and verification functions for new hash function type. However, new hash 
functions must not produce larger chain pieces than the existing one, because of the 
packet size restrictions in the Section 0. 
 
The configuration mechanism follows the original HIPL implementation, so new con-
figuration definitions must follow the HIPL mechanism. This includes creating a parser 
for the configuration option and adding new socket options for the configuration. The 
used AAA-protocol can be easily changed by creating a new AAA Daemon which of-
fers message handling for Access/Accounting requests and responses. The same dae-
mon can offer improved evidence handling and a database client. Support for different 
kind of service offer setups requires modification to several modules. Offering a general 
platform for unknown service types turned out to be difficult with the existing architec-
ture. One of the main reasons is the single threaded functionality of HIPL. This caused 
that every action done during the base exchange stalled the other connections until the 
action was finished.  
7.3.2 Compatibility 
Tests revealed that the implementation is able to interoperate with the original HIPL. 
Actual version control between different versions of NoRSU implementations was not 
implemented. Future modifications in the server or the client side may or may not break 
the compatibility with original HIPL. Because there is not any general handling func-
tionality for parameters, HIPL assumes that parameters are constructed strictly under the 
definition of [8]. As a whole this implementation provides the minimum operations to 
realize NoRSU functionality. Transparency to the upper layer protocols and middlebox-
es was maintained. 
7.3.3 Usability 
Because of the subjective nature of usability, objective evaluation is difficult. The name 
value pair type configuration was implemented, but less Linux oriented users may find 
it difficult to use. Since this implementation aims to support various kinds of service 
offerings, a typical user may not be very skilled in Linux. Still, most of the users find it 
very welcome to get the possibility to reduce the risk of being defrauded. Because the 
implementation is command line based, information about the connection is provided as 
text based. Understanding this information may be difficult to an average user. Howev-
er, the whole configuration can be done in a single file, so the operator could offer these 
configuration files including pre-created hash chains but this can compromise the non-
repudiation. Pre-created hash chain is already known by the creator, so it can forge the 
amount of sent pieces. The only configuration task for the user would be putting the 
configuration file to the right place and configuring right key pair for the device. Even 
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though this may be considered complicated, the whole functionality of the implementa-
tion should be transparent to the user in normal situations. When an upper level applica-
tion requires a connection which requires non-repudiation, HIP base exchange of the 
implementation is triggered automatically. Handling the error situation may require 
some expertise from the user. 
7.3.4 Security and Non-Repudiation 
All the existing HIP security properties were maintained. Yet, there are multiple threats 
against NoRSU. Identity faking is protected with the use of Host Identities. However, 
the Host Identity binds the identity only to the device, not to the actual user. This must 
be taken into account when planning the service scenario. The offer certificate binds the 
service provider to the offer and the response certificate binds the client to the agree-
ment. Both certificates are signed with host’s private key, which protects certificates 
against forging. The response certificate contains the hash of the offer which prevents 
the client from tampering the offer to a more favorable one. TTP certificate provides 
additional trust for the service provider about the customer. The hash chain anchor is 
bound to the signed certificate. The payment is made by sending hash chain pieces. Due 
to the irreversible nature of the hash chain, only the chain creator knows the predecessor 
of the chain piece.  Now payments are bound to payer’s identity and identity is bound to 
the agreement. So the client cannot deny payments afterwards. Messages which contain 
hash chain pieces are encrypted, so even if the message was captured, the capturer could 
not gain advantage of it. If the client stops sending the chain pieces, the service provider 
stops the service. If a threshold against missing chain pieces is used, a dishonest client 
could get advantage since service is not stopped immediately after a chain piece is miss-
ing. The implementation cannot protect against this directly, but this can be avoided by 
keeping the single chain piece value minimal and keeping the chain sending interval 
rather small. 
 
If the client does not receive satisfactory service, it can simply stop sending chain piec-
es. In certain service types, this may cause a problem. When using NoRSU based 
streaming, the client may face unsatisfactory service in the middle of a movie. Now the 
client has already paid half, but even though he or she does not have to pay further, val-
ue of a half seen movie cannot probably compensate the price the client has already 
paid. 
7.3.5 Feasibility 
The implementation works pretty well in a prototype usage. Using the implementation 
in a real environment requires some further work. The implementation offers a technical 
platform for the NoRSU, but lacks non-technical procedures. For example, the situation, 
where evidence is needed to point out a dishonest participant, needs some kind of de-
fined procedure and an adjudicator. The hash chain delivery and key management re-
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quires also some business planning. Even though the Host Identity helps to provide 
identity for a device, there must be also binding to the device owner’s identity. This user 
identity management is out of the scope in this implementation. The implementation 
technical side also requires some fine tuning depending on the usage scenario. For ex-
ample, used RADIUS parameters may require adjustments to acquire compatibility with 
the deployment environment. 
 
One of the biggest feasibility problems is the single threaded functionality of HIPL. 
This makes the handling of large user amounts very difficult. Depending on the speed of 
the authentication, users will face delay. Also malicious clients may stall the base ex-
change, which causes even more delay to various operations for other users. To prevent 
this, timeouts in the base exchange must be minimized which may cause problems to 
users with a large network delay. Delay in the network may cause problems in the tim-
ers when using time based charging. 
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8 FUTURE  WORK 
Before the implementation began, HIPL was chosen to act as a platform. HIPL is the 
most actively developed and supported HIP implementation at the moment. As earlier 
mentioned, one of the biggest downsides in the NoRSU implementation was the single 
threaded design of the HIPL. Since the development of the platform was too time con-
suming to this project, the restriction had to be accepted. In the future, HIPL could be 
modified to support event based functionality, where operation is divided into atomic 
operations called events. This mechanism should contain improvements to select() func-
tion based performance. Events are placed in a queue where HIP Daemon could act as a 
scheduler and pick events sequentially to execution. This could reduce clients from 
blocking each other during the base exchange. The challenge in this approach is how to 
prioritize the different events, to prevent blocking. 
 
Other solution could be the use of threading in the implementation. Each client connec-
tion could run in its own thread. This solution would prevent blocking well, but with a 
large number of clients it can be very resource consuming to the server. Also managing 
the concurrent operation is difficult for the developer. There are available HIP imple-
mentations which support threaded operation. In the future it should be studied if such 
an implementation can be ported to other HIP platform. 
 
From the service variety point of view, using the implementation as a secure WLAN 
hotspot is the most interesting one. Existing charging schemes could be used in a sce-
nario where HIP server acts as a controller to multiple WLAN bridges. A client con-
nects to a base station which directs all the requests to a HIP capable controller. All ne-
gotiation related to the service usage is done with the controller. However, this requires 
breaking the original idea of the HIP to act only in a point to point connection. The 
WLAN operation would require changing the IPsec BEET mode to the tunnel mode, so 
incoming traffic from the clients to the controller could be forwarded securely. This 
would require also developing a proxy service to the access point, which would keep 
track of the open tunnels, so the returning traffic could be directed to the right tunnel. 
Modified HIP firewall could handle this kind of service. [48] [49] 
 
To move the implementation towards actual usage, a few things require some adjust-
ment. The first one is the time based charging. The existing system is pretty coarse and 
large number of clients may cause problems, because connections just lose the track of 
common time, which is synchronized after each sent and received chain piece. Some 
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kind of synchronization mechanism is needed to maintain a reliable service. One solu-
tion could be adding synchronization parameters to UPDATE packets when sending 
hash chain pieces. HIP measures the round trip time of the connection, so the parameter 
could contain the time at the moment of sending including the measured round trip time. 
Based on these, both sides could adjust the counters. Other solution could be using 
some kind of existing time synchronization protocol. This would require binding the 
moment of sending of the hash chain piece to time instead of duration. 
 
One interesting research subject is mobility. Since HIPL has been ported to Maemo and 
Android mobile operating systems, it is possible to use this implementation also in mo-
bile devices. During this project there was not enough time and expertise to investigate 
the compatibility of the implementation in the mobile devices, but theoretically there 
should be no obstacles to port the implementation to smart phones. 
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9 CONCLUSIONS 
Based on the experiences gained from the implementation, HIP and HIPL seem to pro-
vide a suitable development platform for non-repudiable services. HIP has various built-
in mechanisms needed to accomplish the non-repudiation which helped a lot during the 
implementation phase. The protocol specification is pretty loose and the architecture is 
made quite modular, which helps the development and specialization of the protocol. In 
the implementation none of the design choices were forced to be changed because of the 
restrictions of the HIP protocol specification.  
 
On the technical side, the biggest problem of the implementation was the single thread-
ed operation of HIPL. In spite of this restriction it was possible to implement a proto-
type which fulfilled the functional and non-functional requirements at least in a satisfac-
tory manner. For many requirements, the functionality was achieved but the operation is 
pretty coarse. However, as a proof of concept type of solution, the implementation ful-
filled its purpose. During the development, no major blocking problems were faced, 
which tells about the good modularity of the HIPL platform. 
 
Results of the performance measurements support the feasibility of the implementation 
in actual use. If the aforementioned single threaded problem is not taken into account, 
none of the measurements showed the signs of severe performance problems. No major 
unexpected behavior of the implementation was found during the testing. Reason for the 
slow socket operation of the HIPL was not found. If this had been known beforehand, 
the use of the HIP internal communication mechanisms would have been minimized. 
 
With a few modifications, from the technical point of view the NoRSU implementation 
is feasible for the operator to use in actual business. However, this requires the operator 
to define procedures which are still open on the commercial and the legal side. The im-
plementation does not define how the operator should take care of the identity manage-
ment, since now the identities are based on devices. Also the adequacy of the gathered 
evidence remains open. There are no exact definitions in the Finnish law about the non-
repudiation evidence and their validity in the court. So procedures in the misbehavior 
situations require more development to transform them into marketing aspects. In the 
present state, the implementation offers the tools for the customer to get more secure 
service, but lacks the ability to provide the fully secure and reliable service. 
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On the whole, HIP offers a good platform to develop non-repudiable service provision 
for operators. HIP is still under heavy development and the implementations are not yet 
completely mature for commercial use, but in a few years the situation may be better. It 
is not very widespread yet, but the trend of the Internet to containing more and more 
malicious actors may act as a good catalyst for protocols like HIP to spread. 
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APPENDIX A: EXAMPLE NORSU CONFIGURA-
TION 
[ hip_spki ] 
 
issuerhit = 2001:0016:cf10:25f8:9f8a:e55f:b3f8:5b94 // Our Hit 
days = 10 // Validity for certificates 
duration = 10000 // Duration of NoRSU Service 
chainlen = 10 // Length of hashchains 
amount = 8 //  
type = time // Type of service, time or traffic 
unit = s // Unit for service, s or kb  
token = 1 // Amount of chains sent per update 
 
[ hip_norsu_param ] 
encoding = 3 // Encoding type 
name = NoRSUStreamingService // Service name 
subtype = 12 // Service type 
 
[ hip_radius ] 
ttphit = 2001:0019:765d:4422:189b:8de4:72a6:5633 // Hit of TTP 
Server 
 
 
 
